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CASENOTES

CRIMINAL LAW-Search and Seizure-Monitoring of Beeper
Signal Emanating From Private Residence Violates Fourth
Amendment Rights of Those Who Have an Expectation
of Privacy in the Home

-

U.S.

-,

United States v. Karo,
104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984).

In August 1980, James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, Carl
Meuhlenweg.' Meuhlenweg informed a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agent that the ether was intended for use in the extraction of cocaine
from imported clothing. 2 Based on this information, the DEA was granted a
court order to install an electronic tracking device in one of the cans of
ether, which led them to four residences and two commercial storage facilities.' As a result of information gathered through electronic surveillance
and visual observations during a five-month period, a search warrant was
obtained to enter the last home in which the beeper was monitored;4 upon its
1. See United States v. Karo,

-

U.S ....

104 S. Ct. 3296, 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 537

(1984).
2. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 537.
3. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 537 (government given consent by
informant to substitute government-owned can equipped with beeper).
4. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300-01, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 537-38. On September 20, 1980,
the DEA observed Karo pick up the ether from the informant and then followed him to his
residence. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 537 (agents used both visual and
electronic surveillance in following Karo). Later that day, relying on the homing device, the
agents ascertained that the cans of ether had been moved to the home of Horton. See United
States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 530 (1984). Two days later, the beeper signal indicated the car was relocated at Horton's father's home. See United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3300, 82 L. Ed.
2d 530, 537 (1984). Again, the agents had not visually observed the move, but relied on the
beeper to locate the ether's whereabouts. See United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th
Cir. 1983), rev'd, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984). The following day,
monitoring of the beeper revealed the ether had been moved from Horton's father's residence
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execution, the DEA confiscated cocaine and laboratory equipment. 5 This
evidence was used to charge Karo, Horton, Harley, Michael Steele, and
Evan Roth with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. 6 The district
court granted a motion to suppress the confiscated evidence based on the
determination that the government's affidavits supporting the order to install
the beeper were based on intentional misrepresentations.7 The United States
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which
affirmed the lower court with the exception of one defendant.' The Supreme

to a commercial storage locker facility. See United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, -, 104 S. Ct.
3296, 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 537 (1984). The ether was observed during the installation of a
tone alarm in the locker, whereupon visual surveillance ceased. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at
3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 537. The alarm failed and agents were advised by the manager that the
contents had been removed by Horton. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 537.
The agents then tracked the ether with a direction finder to a second storage facility and
detected the odor of ether coming from locker 15, which was rented by Horton and Harley.
See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 537. On February 6, 1981, the DEA agents
observed, through the video camera, Gene Rhodes and an unidentified woman remove the
cans of ethor and place them into Horton's truck. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed.
2d at 537-38 (Rhodes and companion were visually observed and electronically tracked by
beeper surveillance to Rhodes' residence). Later that day, upon leaving Rhodes' driveway, the
ether was followed to a home rented by Horton, Harley, and Michael Steele. See id. at -, 104
S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 538. Beeper monitoring was used to determine that the can
remained in the home. The next day agents observed the windows open on a cold day, indicating ether was being used. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 538.
5. See United States v. Karo,

-

U.S ....

104 S. Ct. at 3296, 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,

538 (1984).
6. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 538. The respondents, except Rhodes,
were charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which reads in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, .

.

. a

controlled substance .... ." See id. at _ 104 S. Ct. at 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 538. The
respondents, including Rhodes, were also indicted for conspiracy to possess under the following provision: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum
punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d
or conspiracy." See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
530, 538 (1984).
7. See United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1435 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, - U.S. -., 104
S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984). The government claimed the misrepresentations were
necessary to protect the confidential status of its informant and told the judge issuing the
installation order that the informant was actually a target of the investigation. See Respondent's Brief at 2-4, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984).
The district court found the evidence was tainted because it was the product of an unauthorized installation and monitoring of a beeper. See United States v. Karo, - U.S..... 104 S.
Ct. 3296, 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 538 (1984).
8. See id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 538. Rhodes was found to not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in any of the areas illegally monitored by the beeper. See
United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296,
82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984).
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Court granted the government's writ of certiorari to determine if the warrantless installation, with the owner's consent, of an electronic tracking device inside a container of ether violated fourth amendment protection of the
subsequent owner of the container, and whether the warrantless monitoring
of the beeper which had entered a private area constituted a fourth amendment violation to the occupants of that area. 9 Held-Reversed. The installation of a beeper into a container with the consent of the owner does not
require a warrant with regard to subsequent owners, 10 but the warrantless
monitoring of the beeper in a private residence violates the occupants' expectation of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment. 1
The fourth amendment safeguards individuals from unreasonable searches
and seizures by requiring that a warrant be issued based on probable cause
before a search or seizure can be conducted. 12 Probable cause determinations are to be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, and searches

9. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 53839 (1984).
10. See id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 3302, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 540.
11. See id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 543-44.
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The fourth amendment was designed to prevent the abuses of general searches and writs of
assistance suffered by American citizens while under English rule. See Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 622-32 (1885). See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 362 (1974) (purpose of fourth amendment safeguards citizens
from historical abuses). The Supreme Court has defined search and seizure: "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in that property." See United States v. Jacobsen, - U.S. -,
-,
104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94 (1984). Probable cause has been defined as
"whether at the moment [of either arrest or warrant application] the facts and circumstances
within their [(police or magistrate's)] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had
committed or was committing an offense." See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). See
generally I W.

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A

TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-

§ 3.2 (1977 & Supp. 1984) (examination of development and application of probable
cause). The probable cause requirement protects the citizen against intrusions based solely on
the discretion of police officers. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)
(fourth amendment imposes reasonable standard on law officials' discretion); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (probable cause standard represents necessary accommodation
between individual's rights and state's duty to control crime); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (probable cause requirement prevents baseless
searches). See generally Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT.
L. REV. 227, 243-56 (1984) (discussing difficulties in concept of probable cause).
MENT
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conducted without a warrant are presumed unreasonable. 1 3 Although adhering to a preference for warrants, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized limited exceptions to this requirement.' 4 In order to benefit from
the protection provided by the fourth amendment, an individual must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing
seized. 5 To guarantee the citizen will not suffer from fourth amendment

13. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (fourth amendment protection ensured by requiring neutral and detached magistrate to determine if evidentiary inferences justify search). The Supreme Court has demonstrated a preference for search warrants.
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (first principle of fourth amendment is
police must have approval of magistrate before search); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395
(1978) (warrantless four day search of murder scene unreasonable); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (searches not conducted with approval of magistrate per se unreasonable,
subject only to few exceptions). In addition to establishing probable cause, the warrant must
satisfy particularity requirements in its description of things to be searched or seized. See, e.g.,
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979) (warrant cannot leave to discretion of
police what items to seize); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971) (where
warrant fails to mention particular object, fourth amendment violation results); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (requirement that warrant particularly describe things
to be seized prevents general searches). See generally Bloom, The Supreme Court and Its Purported Preferencefor Search Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV. 231, 231-70 (1983) (discussion of
Supreme Court's fluctuating warrant requirements).
14. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, - U.S. -, -, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2100, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 745
(1984) (nighttime entry into home absent exigent circumstances and without warrant violates
fourth amendment); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (border search reasonable absent probable cause); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (hot pursuit of
suspect justifies warrantless entry); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248
(1973) (voluntary consent can justify warrantless search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969) (police may search, without warrant, immediate area in control of arrested person);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925) (probable cause that car contains criminal evidence and exigent circumstances due to car's mobility justify warrantless search). Brief
detentions and frisks are also permitted without a warrant. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968) (officer may conduct frisk based upon reasonable suspicion); see also Note, Criminal
Law-Search and Seizure-Michigan v. Long, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 443, 445 n.14 (1983). See
generally Special Project, Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1981-1982, 71 GEO. L.J. 339, 369-97 (1982) (overview of
warrantless searches).
15. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742, 80 L. Ed. 2d
214, 225-26 (1984) (no legitimate expectation in open field); Illinois v. Andreas, - U.S.....103 S. Ct. 3319, 3325, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 1040 (1983) (individual cannot have expectation of
privacy in container of contraband); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (fourth amendment protection attached when person's reasonable expectation
of privacy violated). The reasonable expectation analysis is a subjective belief on the part of
the individual which society would recognize as reasonable. See id. at 361. This analysis has
been used by the courts to determine if there has been a violation of fourth amendment protection. See J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6, .7 (1982) (discussion of Supreme Court's
application of two-pronged test proposed in Katz). See generally Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the "LegitimateExpectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1298-1301
(1981) (discussion of development of expectation of privacy).
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violations, evidence obtained 16in disregard of the individual's rights cannot be
used to obtain a conviction.
During the era in which government electronic surveillance technology
was still in its infancy, the Supreme Court required an actual physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area before a fourth amendment violation would occur.17 This analysis was presented in Olmstead v. United
States,"8 which held that where a wiretap was installed, in the absence of a
trespass, there was no search 9 and that conversations, as intangible items,
were incapable of being seized.2" The possibility that technology might soon
outgrow the protection provided under the trespass doctrine was forecasted

16. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ("rule's prime purpose
is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (evidence obtained in violation of
fourth amendment inadmissible in state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914) (evidence seized in violation of constitutional protection should not be used in federal
courts). See generally J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 20.2 (1982) (development and application of exclusionary rule). The Court has recently recognized exceptions to this exclusionary
rule. See United States v. Leon,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 692

(1984) (exclusionary rule no avail when officers gather evidence in good faith reliance of invalid search warrant); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

104 S. Ct. 3424, 3428, 82 L.

Ed. 2d 737, 744 (1984) (officer's reasonable belief that magistrate issued valid warrant precludes exclusionary rule application upon evidence seized from warrant's execution). To benefit from the exclusionary rule, one must have standing to object to the admissibility of the
evidence. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (defendant did not have
expectation of privacy in companion's purse; therefore, could not object to evidence unlawfully
seized from it); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978) (passengers in automobile cannot
invoke exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized from glove compartment and under seat);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (right to claim exclusionary rule depends upon
reasonable expectation of privacy in thing searched and not upon property right). See generally Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a Search and Seizure.: The Passing of Old Rules and Some
Suggestionsfor New Ones, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 387, 390-95 (1981) (comprehensive study of
standing and proposals for new test). The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence that
indirectly derives from an illegal search and seizure. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, - U.S. - 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2512, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 387 (1984) (body would inevitably have been discovered; therefore, evidence pertaining to its discovery admissible despite being fruit of illegal
confession); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980) (confession resulting from illegal
detention admissible if voluntary); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (live
testimony derived from illegal search admissible based on attenuation from tainted search).
17. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (intrusion of
microphone into protected area constituted fourth amendment violation); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (detectaphone placed against office wall not trespass; evidence
from overheard conversations admissible); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928)
(wiretap installed in basement of office building did not constitute physical invasion required
for fourth amendment violation).
18. 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
19. See id. at 457.
20. See id. at 466.
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in Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead.2 1 With the advent of
sophisticated electronic surveillance technology,2 2 the Supreme Court rejected the trespass concept of fourth amendment protection in Katz v. United
States.2 3 The majority in Katz, holding the fourth amendment "protects
people and not simply areas,", 24 instated the "expectation of privacy" test
and abandoned the requirement of physical intrusion in order to determine a
search. 25 In applying the Katz test, courts have relied on Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion which sets forth a two-fold analysis of an individual's
expectation of privacy. 26 First, an individual is required to have a subjective
expectation of privacy; second, this expectation must be one "that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ,27 With the emergence of the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy concept, the lower courts set about resolving the various constitutional issues arising from the installation and moni-

21. See id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued:
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely
to stop with wire tapping [sic]. Ways may some day [sic] be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences at
home. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions
of individual security?
Id. at 474.
22. See J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 1.01 (1977) (discussion of

capabilities of electronic surveillance devices); see also Note, Anthropotelemetry: Dr.
Schwitzgebel's Machine, 80 HARV. L. REV. 403, 408 (1966) (discussion of possible privacy
problems evolving from use of electronic surveillance).
23. See 389 U.S. 347, (1967).
24. See id. at 353. The Court held: "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,

even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he

seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." Id. at 351-52 (citation omitted). Katz also held that intangible things, such as
conversations, could be seized. See id. at 353.
25. See id. at 351-53. The listening device was attached without a warrant. See id. at
356. Katz held that the government's attachment of a listening device to the exterior of a
telephone booth violated the occupant's fourth amendment protection because a person who
enters a public phone booth and closes the door behind him has an expectation that his conversations will remain private. See id. at 352.
103 S. Ct. 3319, 3323, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003,
26. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, - U.S .....
1010 (1983) (threshold question is whether one had expectation of privacy in container's contents); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736-37 (1979) (recognized Harlan's expectation of
privacy analysis and applied it to hold that suspect did not have an expectation of privacy in
telephone numbers dialed from his home); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (where one
exhibits reasonable expectation of privacy, he should be protected from unreasonable government intrusion) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). See generally Note,
Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1472 (1977)
(critique on application of expectation of privacy test as applied to beeper cases).
27. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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toring of beepers.28
Beepers, also known as beacons or transponders, are electronic signaling
devices used to determine the location of items to which the beepers are
attached. 29 These devices have been used to investigate a variety of criminal
activities and have been attached to an assortment of objects. 3° From the
outset of litigation involving these devices, the circuits developed discernible
philosophies in confronting the issues before them.3 1 In examining these de28. See Case Comment, Electronic TrackingDevices and the Fourth Amendment-United
States v. Michael, 16 GA. L. REV. 197, 200 n. 19 (1981) (extensive citation of cases utilizing
reasonable expectation of privacy approach to resolve electronic tracking problems).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (5th Cir.) (may be described
as "miniature, battery-powered radio transmitter" which emits signals to directional finder),
rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382,
1387 (5th Cir. 1980) (beeper conveys information which could normally only be gathered
through visual observation and allows authorities to find object if they lose sight of it), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.) (beeper not a
recording device and therefore does not transmit conversation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002
(1976). See generally Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the FourthAmendment, 86
YALE L.J. 1461, 1462-1508 (1977) (general discussion on electronic beepers and their role in
law enforcement). One form of beeper emits an altered signal when the package in which it is
placed is opened. See United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1976).
30. See United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1515 (5th Cir. 1984) (beeper installed
inside airplane); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1981) (beeper placed on
exterior of van), cert. denied,454 U.S. 590 (1981); United States v. Braithwaite, 709 F.2d 1450,
1452 (11th Cir. 1983) (beeper placed in drum of chemicals). See generally Note, Criminal
Procedure--Searchand Seizure-Beeper Monitoring and the Fourth Amendment: What Has
Knotts Wrought? 58 TUL. L. REV. 849, 849 n. 1 (1984) (discussion of articles to which beepers
have been attached).
31. Compare United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.) (beepers placed in drum
.of caffeine and on battery of car not a search), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976) and United
States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 491-92 (9th Cir.) (monitoring of airplane in public airspace
not a search), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978) with United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859,
864 (5th Cir. 1975) (installation of beeper on automobile is a search) and United States v.
Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir.) (government must have warrant to monitor container in
home and must have probable cause to monitor beeper in vehicle), cert. denied sub nom.
Bobisink v. United States, 435 U.S. 926 (1977). The circuits' holdings became identifiable as
rulings accumulated. See Note, Finders Keepers, Beepers Weepers: United States v. Knotts-A
RealisticApproach to Beeper Use and the Fourth Amendment, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483, 488-97
(1983) (traces developments of circuits' holdings in beeper cases). The First Circuit seems to
indicate a preference for search warrants. See United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st
Cir.) (distinguishing warrant requirement in regards to contraband and non-contraband
items), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1977). The Fifth Circuit has narrowed its view regarding
fourth amendment protection and the beeper issues. Compare United States v. Michael, 645
F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir.) (reasonable suspicion justifies attachment of beeper to van), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981) with United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 1975)
(failure to procure warrant prior to beeper attachment to car fourth amendment violation).
The Ninth Circuit generally finds no fourth amendment implication in the installation and use
of beepers. See United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.) (installation and monitoring of beeper not a search under fourth amendment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). For a
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cisions, it is evident there is disagreement among the circuits as to whether
the use of beepers represents fourth amendment activity.32 Most courts use
a bifurcated analysis, treating the installation and monitoring of beepers as
separate issues.3 3 Installation determinations have revolved around the degree of intrusion involved in the attachment of the monitoring device,34 the

review of conflicting holdings among the circuits, see Marks & Batey, Electronic Tracking

Devices: Fourth Amendment Problems and Solutions, 67 Ky. L.J. 987, 989-99 (1978-1979);
Note, Finders Keepers, Beepers Weepers: United States v. Knotts-A Realistic Approach to
Beeper Use and the Fourth Amendment, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483, 488 (1983) (overview of
diversity in holdings regarding beeper jurisprudence); Case Comment, Electronic TrackingDevices and the Fourth Amendment-United States v. Michael, 16 GA. L. REV. 197, 200-212
(1981) (circuit by circuit history of beeper cases).
32. Compare United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th Cir. 1980) (installation of
beeper, even if never activated, possible violation of fourth amendment), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
935 (1981) and United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980) (beeper placed in
drum of chemicals is search and seizure and must satisfy fourth amendment) with United
States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1978) (beeper which indicates when package
opens not a search) and United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.) (monitoring
of transponder to follow plane not a search within fourth amendment), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
847 (1979). See generally Note, ConstitutionalLaw--Search and Seizure-United States v.
Knotts, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 319, 321 (1983) (comparison of circuits' decisions).

33. See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.) (installation of beeper
on exterior of van minimal intrusion, less than stop and frisk, and monitoring did not violate
defendant's expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v.
Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir.) (adopts "bifurcated analytical framework" to determine if installation and monitoring of transponder in airplane violates fourth amendment
rights), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th
Cir. 1978) (if installation constitutional then court must evaluate monitoring to determine if
there has been infringement of reasonable expectation of privacy). But see, e.g., United States
v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (court only addressed installation in determining validity of warrant; attachment of beeper on any vehicle in public does not require warrant); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1325 (8th Cir. 1976) (installation only issue
raised in beeper case involving "bumper beeper" and was justified on exigent circumstances),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1975)
(court concerned only with installation in holding attachment of beeper on motor vehicle a
search). For a discussion of the courts' bifurcated approach, see Marks & Batey, Electronic
Tracking Devices: Fourth Amendment Problems and Solutions, 67 KY. L.J. 987, 990-98 (19781979) (discussion of divergent approaches to installation and monitoring). See generally Note,
Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1465-68
(1977) (examines installation and monitoring issues).
34. See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950
(1981). After receiving a tip that the defendant was purchasing large quantities of precursor
chemicals to manufacture illegal drugs, a DEA agent attached a beeper to the exterior of a van;
the installation was held to be such a minor intrusion that no seizure occurred. See id. at 258;
see also United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir.) (reasonableness of search depends
on balancing government's interest with intrusion of privacy), cert. denied sub nom. Bobisink
v. United States, 435 U.S. 926 (1977). But cf United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 940 (6th
Cir. 1980) (fourth amendment will not overlook de minimis intrusions that result in violation
of expectations of privacy). The minimal intrusion concept derives its credence from Caldwell
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expectation of privacy in the object attached with the beeper," and whether
the attachment fell within recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 3 6 The courts permit most installations to be conducted without a warrant; however, if agents obtain a warrant, they risk having it later declared
defective. 37 After deciding any alleged installation violations, the courts determine if the monitoring of the beeper intruded on a reasonable expectation
of privacy.3 8

v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), which provides that "[a] car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny [since] [i]t travels [through] public thoroughfares where [both] its occupants
and its contents are in plain view." See id. at 590.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 1980) (attachment of
beeper inside chemical container under government's control did not violate reasonable expectation of privacy of defendants); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th Cir. 1980)
(defendants had no privacy interest in drum when they took possession, and, therefore, chemicals placed in beeper-fitted drum was not a search), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United
States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.) (person has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in item received for exchange of heroin), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976). For a comprehensive discussion of cases using the reasonable expectation of privacy test, see Case Comment,
Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment-United States v. Michael, 16 GA. L.
REV. 197, 200 & n.20 (1981). See generally Marks & Batey, Electronic Tracking Devices:
FourthAmendment Problems and Solutions, 67 Ky. L.J. 987, 989-90 (1978-1979). Analysis of
beeper problems can be divided into three categories: (1) court finds a violation of reasonable
expectation of privacy; (2) no violation of reasonable expectation of privacy exists; and (3)
fourth amendment requirements are satisfied by other occurrences. See id. at 989-90.
36. See United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981) (beeper placed in
package of heroin justifiable since customs agents opened package pursuant to border search),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1981); see also United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1325 (8th
Cir. 1976) (beeper attached to automobile to foil extortion scheme justified under exigent circumstances), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977). The courts have rejected arguments that an
owner could not consent to the installation of a beeper because the defendant had a contract
right in the item installed. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th Cir.
1980) (rejects defendant's contentions that, under business code, title passed to purchaser at
time goods were identified by contract and held that U.C.C. only determines contract rights,
not fourth amendment rights), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States v. Abel, 548
F.2d 591, 592 (5th Cir.) (informal agreement between owner of plane and defendant did not
preclude owner from granting consent for beeper installation), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956
(1977); United States v. Stephenson, 490 F. Supp. 619, 621-22 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (rejects defendant's assertion that U.C.C. § 2-501(1) and Michigan statutory law gave defendant a property interest in can of chemicals).
37. See United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir. 1980) (warrant defective for
lack of termination date; placement of beeper in chemical container fourth amendment violation); see also United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (warrant which
authorized agent to install beeper inside plane did not authorize agent to break into private
property to attach beeper). See generally Note, United States v. Knotts: The Electronic Beeper
and the Unwary Traveler, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 549, 552 n.33 (1983) (list of warrantless
installation approvals); Note, TrackingKatz: Beepers, Privacy, and the FourthAmendment, 86
YALE L.J. 1461, 1464 (1977) (overview of courts' permission for and general practice of warrantless installations).
38. See United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1387-88, (5th Cir. 1980) (to resolve issues
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The courts have been far from agreement as to whether, or in what circumstances, the monitoring of a beeper triggers fourth amendment activity. 9 In dismissing alleged fourth amendment violations, some courts have
4
held there is no expectation of privacy in movements exposed to the public, 0
or in the possession of contraband. 4' To justify holding that monitoring is
not a search, other courts have compared it with enhanced senses or equated
it with public observations. 42 Frequently, the lower courts have addressed
the issue of admissibility of evidence when government agents lose contact
with the beeper's signal or abandon visual surveillance after monitoring has

in "swamp of beeper law," threshold question of installation must be answered before determining if tracking beeper is fourth amendment violation).
39. Compare United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1982) (because
beeper emanating from cabin revealed minimal information as to location of can, only slight
intrusion and no search within fourth amendment), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1271,
75 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1983) and United States v. French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 804 (W.D. Okla. 1976)
(monitoring not search or seizure under fourth amendment) with United States v. Bailey, 628
F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980) (beeper monitoring of can of chemicals from storage room constituted search) and United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.) (monitoring of
airplane not a search), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978). See generally Note, CriminalProcedure-Search and Seizure-Beeper Monitoring and the Fourth Amendment. What Has Knotts
Wrought?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 849, 852-54 (1984) (circuits' analyses of monitoring issue).
40. See, e.g., Bruneau v. United States, 594 F.2d 1190, 1197 (8th Cir.) (no reasonable
expectation of privacy in movements of airplanes because monitored for safety purposes), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir. 1978)
(less expectation of privacy in clandestine laboratory because open to outside view and accessible to public); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.) (if beeper legally installed,
monitoring of automobile in public indistinguishable from visual surveillance), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1002 (1976). But see United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 949 (6th Cir. 1980)
(Keith, J., concurring) (individual should be able to move about without worrying about government monitoring movement); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1975).
In Holmes, the court held:
A person has a right to expect that when he drives his car into the street, the police will
not attach an electronic surveillance device to his car in order to track him. Although he
can anticipate visual surveillance, he can reasonably expect to be "alone" in his car when
he enters it and drives away.
Id. at 866.
41. See United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978) (since package was
contraband and border search authorized installation, subsequent monitoring merely augmented officers' senses and did not constitute search); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887,
890 (1st Cir. 1976) (no expectation of privacy in cocaine discovered by customs agents).
42. See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.) (expectation of privacy in
movements diminished in automobile; beeper only helped in surveillance), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 950 (1981); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.) (no distinction between
use of beeper and visual surveillance aids, such as binoculars, tracking dogs, and spotlights),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). See generally Note, Electronic Tracking Devices and Privacy: See No Evil, Hear No Evil, But Beware of Trojan Horses, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 227, 245
(1977) (discussion of courts' comparison of monitoring with enhanced senses).
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occurred in a protected area.4" Whether such a monitoring of a private area
is indeed a search protected by the fourth amendment has been the dividing
line among the circuits."
The United States Supreme Court rendered its first decision involving
beeper monitoring in United States v. Knotts.45 In Knotts, the Supreme
Court held that monitoring of a beeper in a can of chloroform was not a
search and seizure deserving of fourth amendment protection and, thus, did
not infringe on the defendant's expectation of privacy.4 6 The Court reasoned that monitoring the beeper while it was being transported by automobile to the defendant's cabin was allowable under the diminished expectation
of privacy associated with automobiles; monitoring of the container as it
remained outside the cabin was permissible under the open fields doctrine.4 7
The Court did not address the issue of installation because it was not

43. See, e.g., United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1980) (agents lost
contact with beeper placed in container at supply company, but later located it by signal emitting from private residence); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 349-50 (10th Cir. 1978)
(beeper placed in container, monitored in home, then contact lost and reestablished in laboratory); United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146, 148 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (beeper implanted in
plane, monitoring lost for over a month, and when rediscovered, customs agents unable to
ascertain its identity due to number of beepers in air). See generally Note, Tracking Katz
Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1464 & n.17 (1977) (use of
beepers and function in investigations).
44. Compare United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1980) (monitoring
of house invaded no expectation of privacy) and United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 351
(10th Cir. 1978) (monitoring laboratory did not violate expectation of privacy) with United
States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980) (monitoring of private area is search) and
United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir.) (monitoring of house requires warrant),
cert. denied sub nom. Bobisink v. United States, 435 U.S. 926 (1977). See generally Note,
Finders Keepers, Beepers Weepers: United States v. Knotts-A RealisticApproach to Beeper Use
and the Fourth Amendment, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483, 497 (1983) (discussion of Katz test
applied when beepers enter private house).
45. See - U.S.... -, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1087, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 64 (1983).
46. See id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 1087, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 64.
47. See id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 1085, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 62. Activities which take place in
open fields are not protected by the fourth amendment. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57, 59 (1924). For an in depth discussion of Knotts and its application of the open fields
doctrine, see Note, United States v. Knotts: The Electronic Beeperand the Unwary Traveler, 10
OHio N.U.L. REV. 549, 555-57 (1984). The Court compared the monitoring with enhanced
sensory abilities. See United States v. Knotts,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

103 S. Ct. 1081, 1086, 75 L. Ed.

2d 55, 63 (1983) (nothing prohibits police from augmenting their senses by scientific means).
For a critique of the enhanced perception rationale, see Note, Finders Keepers, Beepers Weepers: United States v. Knotts-A RealisticApproach to Beeper Use and the Fourth Amendment,
27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483, 500-01 (1983) (Knotts confuses government agents about need to get
warrant). See generally Note, Beeper Monitoring and the Fourth Amendment: What Has
Knotts Wrought?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 849, 859-62 (1984) (criticizing Knotts as turning fourth
amendment analysis into protection of places not people).
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challenged.4
The lower courts have differed in their interpretations of the Knotts decision; some courts welcomed the decision to help resolve the beeper issues,49
while another found a way to distinguish Knotts. 0 In recent cases, however,
courts have invariably addressed an issue different from that in Knotts, monitoring a beeper which had entered a private place.5 1 Without any clear-cut
guidance regarding the installation of beepers or subsequent monitoring in
private areas, the lower courts could
only speculate as to how the Supreme
52
issues.
these
resolve
would
Court
In United States v. Karo,53 the Supreme Court held that a third party's
consent was valid to allow the installation of a beeper in a container under
his possession, and the subsequent transfer of the can to its purchasers did
not trigger fourth amendment concerns.5 4 The Court also held that the warrantless monitoring of a residence was a search and violated the fourth
amendment rights of those with a privacy interest in the residence.55 The
Court, however, found the evidence seized from the last monitored home
pursuant to a search warrant should not be suppressed because the DEA had
acquired sufficient untainted information to support a finding of probable

48. See United States v. Knotts,

-

U.S ..

103 S. Ct. 1081, 1085, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 60

(1983).
49. See United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1145-46 (5th Cir. 1983) (Knotts clarifies
"beeper jurisprudence" by applying bifurcated approach and focusing on aspect of monitoring), rev'd on othergrounds, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1984). Butts interpreted Knotts as holding
the monitoring would only be permissible if the beeper was legally installed. See id. at 1146;
see also United States v. Emanuel, 572 F. Supp. 1215, 1217 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (follows Butts
interpretation of Knotts that installation may taint monitoring).
50. See United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1983) (Knotts does not answer issue of installation or monitoring within private residence; therefore, court looked to
decisions within its circuit to resolve issues). One court avoided applying Knotts because of a
lack of standing. See United States v. Braithwaite, 709 F.2d 1450, 1454 (11th Cir. 1983).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 1983) (beeper monitoring of chemical containers in three separate homes); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 704
(9th Cir. 1983) (beeper in box of chemicals monitored in two residences); United States v.
Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1983) (beeper monitoring occurred in four residences),
rev'd on other grounds, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1984).
52. See United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1517 (5th Cir. 1984) (Knotts intentionally
left unanswered question of installation and how it should be addressed); United States v.
Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1983) (Knotts cannot control issue of private residence
monitoring and does not reduce expectation of privacy). See generally Note, United States v.
Knotts: The Electronic Beeper and the Unwary Traveler, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 549, 562
(1984) (Supreme Court has yet to resolve installation issue).
53. - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984).
54. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3302, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 539-40 (transfer of can only created
potential for search).
55. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3303, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 541 (monitoring allowed agents to
obtain information not exposed to public).
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cause in its warrant affidavit. 6 Justice White, writing for the majority, upheld the installation by finding that the purchasers had no expectation of
privacy in the containers at the time of the beeper placement.57 The transfer
of the can to the buyers was not a fourth amendment violation because the
transfer conveyed no information to the DEA that would violate a privacy
interest; 58 furthermore, the mere presence of the beeper did not interfere
with any possessory interest of the subsequent owners. 59 In addressing the
monitoring of the residence, Justice White reiterated the Court's desire to
protect the sanctity of the home. 6° The majority held steadfast to the warrant requirement and rejected the government's argument that it should be
allowed to monitor
beepers in private residences whenever it suspects crimi61
activity.
nal
Justice Stevens, writing a separate opinion in which Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined, only agreed with the majority's holding that monitoring a
beeper which has entered a private residence was a search deserving of

56. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3305-07, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 545 (warrant could be obtained
without using beeper information). The Court allowed admission of the evidence obtained
from the final house monitored because it found enough untainted information gathered by
visual observations to support probable cause for the warrant. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 330507, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 544-45.
57. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3301, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 539 (DEA installed beeper in their
own can then switched it with consent of informant). The issue presented to the Court reads:
"[W]hether installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original
owner constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the
container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper.
Id.
at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3299, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 536.
58. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3302, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 539 (at most, transfer represented
potential for invasion of privacy).
59. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3302, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 540 (mere occupation of space by
beeper did not violate fourth amendment).
60. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3303, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 541 (searches conducted inside home
presumed unreasonable unless exigent circumstances exist). The Court equated the beeper
with an agent secretly inside the home looking for the ether. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3303,
82 L. Ed. 2d at 541. The Court found Knotts distinguishable since, in that case, the claim that
monitoring took place inside a residence was not presented to the Court. See id. -, 104 S. Ct.
at 3303, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 540.
61. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3304-05, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 542-43 (unsupervised monitoring
would diminish privacy of home, and requiring neutral and detached magistrate to approve
monitoring would protect citizens from abuse). The Court stated that although the government would not be able to identify the place where the search would occur, this should not
preclude it from obtaining a warrant. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 543-44.
The government contended the warrant requirement is inapposite to monitoring because the
scope of the search is already limited to minimal information; agents do not know in advance
where monitoring might occur to be able to describe places to be searched and advance notice
to a suspect would defeat the goals of surveillance. See Petitioner's Brief at 41-43, United
States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984).
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fourth amendment protection. 62 He disagreed with the majority's finding
that the transfer of the beeper-laden container did not constitute an infringement of the respondent's possessory rights. 6 3 This disagreement was premised upon the belief that what a person keeps from public view is deserving
of fourth amendment protection." The opinion pointed to the fact that,
from the time the container entered Karo's house, it was concealed from
public view and could not be relocated without the use of the beeper. 65 Justice Stevens found that, because the beeper allowed the DEA to learn the
whereabouts of an item hidden from public view, there was a search. 66 In
conclusion, Justice Stevens stated that government agents should be required
to procure a warrant
prior to the installation of a beeper on the property of a
67
private citizen.
The holdings of the Karo Court can hardly be viewed as surprising in light

62. See United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3310, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
550 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
63. See id. at - n.2, 104 S. Ct. at 3311 n.2, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 550 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). The attachment of the beeper resulted in an assertion of
dominion and control over the container which resulted in a seizure. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct.
at 3311, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 551 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); see also
United States v. Jacobsen,

-

U.S. .,

-,

104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94 (1984)

(seizure occurs upon interference with possessory interest).
64. See United States v. Karo, -

U.S.

-,

_ 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3311-14, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,

551-54 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); see also Katz v. United
States 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (what person exposes to public not protected by fourth
amendment).
65. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3312, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
553 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). The fact that the container
was carried on the public roads did not reveal the container's location, as it remained concealed from view in the trunk. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3312, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 553 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
66. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3314, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 554 (Stevens, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part). In refuting the majority's findings that no privacy interest is infringed until
the government begins monitoring, Stevens drew the analogy that "[a] bath tub is a less private
area when the plumber is present even if his back is turned." See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3314,
82 L. Ed. 2d at 554 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Stevens admonished
the majority for conducting a de novo review of the record to justify the admission of the
evidence seized during the final search since the issue was not before the court. See id. at -,
104 S. Ct. at 3314, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 555 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
67. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3314, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 555 (Stevens, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part). Stevens agreed with the majority's denouncement of Justice O'Connor's
concurrence as being so narrow as to leave nothing of fourth amendment protection. See id. at
n.9, 104 S. Ct. at 3313 n.9, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 554 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor proposed that in order for the homeowner to have a privacy interest in a container brought into his home, he must be able to control the movements of the
container in public and have sufficient interest in the container to consent to its search. See id.
at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3307-10, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 545-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
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of many decisions of the circuit courts.6 8 The upholding of the installation
of a beeper based on consent is well established in the lower courts. 69 The
Supreme Court lays to rest the argument that one has a reasonable expectation to receive property coming into his possession free of electronic trans-

mitting devices.7" The Karo Court's holding regarding the installation,
however, must be limited to its facts, as the majority does not address in
general the installation of beepers.7" By relieving the government of the burden of obtaining a warrant when a beeper is installed with the permission of
the possessory owner,72 but requiring a warrant for subsequent beeper monitoring in private areas,73 the Court has placed the government in a precarious position.7 4 A significant number of beeper cases involve the installation
of beepers into precursor chemical containers.7 5 Often the government

68. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980) (electronic surveillance of personal property located in private areas is search and must comply with fourth
amendment); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 114 (1st Cir.) (evidence inadmissible if
gathered from monitoring of beeper located in house), cert. denied sub nom. Bobisink v. United
States, 435 U.S. 926 (1977); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.) (no expectation of privacy in drums in possession of chemical company), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002
(1976).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1980) (supply house's.
consent to keep chemical drum with installed beeper); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d
1190, 1194 (8th Cir.) (owner's consent to install transponder on plane precluded fourth
amendment violation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Devorce, 526 F.
Supp. 191, 199-200 (D. Conn. 1981) (consent of car rental company valid for installation of
beeper), afjfd sub nom. United States v. Lombardo, 697 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Petitioner's Brief at 18-19, United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d
530 (1984).
70. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3302, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
539 (1984). The right to receive property free from beepers has been advocated in the lower
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1521-22 (5th Cir. 1984) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (citizens should reasonably expect beepers will not be present in private areas);
United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1983) (legitimate expectation of privacy
interest that property coming into possession will not be carrying beepers), rev'd, - U.S.
104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 943 n.7 (6th
Cir. 1980) (government should not be able to sell property containing beepers).
71. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3301-02, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
539-40 (1984).
72. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 540. Consent is recognized as an
exception to the warrant requirement. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248
(1973).
73. See United States v. Karo, - U.S .....
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
543-44 (1984) (search of house requires warrant).
74. See Petitioner's Brief at 42-43, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82
L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984) (government runs risk of committing illegal search because it cannot
control beeper from entering private area).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, - U.S ....
103 S. Ct. 1081, 1083, 75 L. Ed. 2d
55, 60 (1983) (beeper placed in drum of ether); United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 453 (6th
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agents lose eye contact with the beeper or choose to abandon visual observation and rely solely on electronic surveillance. 76 Invariably, most of these
containers enter constitutionally protected areas." Under the holding in
Karo, once the government locates the beeper by monitoring a private area,
it has committed a fourth amendment violation.7 8 Occasionally, DEA
agents have protected themselves from the Karo holding by procuring warrants for the installation of beepers in chemical containers.7 9 By limiting the
warrant requirement to monitoring, however, Karo will create problems
with government agents conducting the routine "precursor chemical investigation" where the monitoring device is installed without a warrant, visual
contact is lost or abandoned, and electronic surveillance is initiated after the
device has entered a constitutionally protected area.8 °
The guidelines in Karo place the government in the dilemma of choosing
among the following options when it wishes to monitor a beeper without a
warrant obtained before installation: (1) apply for a warrant to monitor the

Cir. 1983) (beepers placed in cans of chemicals); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 704
(9th Cir. 1983) (beeper implanted in box of chemicals).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts - U.S..., -, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1083, 75 L. Ed. 2d
55, 60 (1983) (officers ceased visual surveillance); United States v. Brathwaite, 709 F.2d 1450,
1452 (1 1th Cir. 1983); (agents abandoned visual observations); United States v. Hufford, 539
F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir.) (agents used beeper to relocate pickup truck), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002
(1976).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 939 (6th Cir. 1980) (entered apartment complex and storage room); United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 350 (10th Cir.
1978) (house and laboratory); United States v. Stephenson, 490 F. Supp. 619, 620-21 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (garage and residence).
78. See, United States v. Karo,

-

U.S ....

104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,

543-44 (1984). Monitoring of a beeper concealed from public view presents a serious threat to
privacy of the home and must be checked by the fourth amendment. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at
3304, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 542.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1983) (DEA agent
obtained warrant to install beeper in box of chemicals); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938,
939 (6th Cir. 1980) (magistrate authorized installation of beeper in drum of chemicals); United
States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1385 (5th Cir. 1980) (magistrate granted order to install beeper
in drum of chemicals after probable cause determination), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981).
Warrants have also been used in the attachment of beepers to other items. See United States v.
Devorce, 526 F. Supp. 191, 193 (D. Conn. 1981) (magistrate approval of beeper installed in
rental car), affid sub nom. United States v. Lombrado, 697 F.2d 299 (2nd Cir. 1982); United
States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (warrant used to attach beeper to
airplane).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 1983) (monitoring
revealed container had been moved to another residence); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d
938, 939 (6th Cir. 1980) (beeper signal lost, then relocated in apartment building); UP,;ed
States v. Stephenson, 490 F. Supp. 619, 620 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (beeper monitoring revealed
container had been moved to residence).
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beeper;' (2) continue monitoring without a warrant only while it is exposed
to public view;8 2 (3) continue monitoring the beeper and, if the beeper enters
a private area, argue that a warrant exception existed due to exigent circumstances;8 3 or (4) monitor the beeper illegally and wait for it to enter a public

area.8 4 The obvious ramification of the Karo decision is that courts can no
longer justify the monitoring of a private residence based on the lawful installation of a beeper.8 5

The majority recognized the government's contentions that the requirement of a warrant prior to the monitoring of a private area would, in effect,
force the government to get a warrant for every monitoring.8 6 This being

81. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....

104 S. Ct. 3296, 3304, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,

542 (1984) (warrant required to search home).
82. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3303, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 542 (monitoring of beeper in public
area does not require warrant).
83. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 544. The lower courts have recognized exigent circumstances as a justification for monitoring. See United States v. Shovea, 580
F.2d 1388, 1388 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978); see also United States v. Frazier,
538 F.2d 1322, 1324 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977). Exigent circumstances, however, are rarely applicable due to the length of most electronic surveillance investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Cassity, 720 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 1983) (over two months
of surveillance); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1982) (over four
months of surveillance); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 939 (6th Cir. 1980) (over two
months of surveillance).
84. See United States v. Karo, - U.S.
& n.7, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305-07 & n.7, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 530, 544-45 & n.7 (1984). The Court held that the tainted monitoring of Karo's house
was cured when the beeper was rediscovered in the second storage facility. See id. at -, 104 S.
Ct. at 3306, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 545. The Court reasoned that since the beeper did not reveal what
locker it was coming from, there was no search. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3306, 82 L. Ed. 2d
at 545. From the warehouse, the agents were able to visually observe the ether being transported to its final destination. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3306-07, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 544-45. The
majority emphasizes the fact that monitoring the warehouse was not dependent on the earlier
monitoring; therefore, it was permissible. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 3306, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 545.
This analysis has been used by at least one circuit court to admit evidence resulting from
monitoring. See United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir. 1978) (since beeper
signal was lost after it was monitored emanating from house, subsequent relocation was result
of independent effort and was not tainted). But see United States v. Stephenson, 490 F. Supp.
613, 624 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (monitoring of house was "one connected transaction" with prior
monitoring of different house; therefore, defendant could suppress evidence).
85. See United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
540 (1984) (although installation found legal, Court looks to monitoring to determine fourth
amendment violations); cf United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981) (lawful attachment pursuant to border search, coupled with fact goods were contraband, justified
monitoring package within home), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Botero,
589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978) (beeper placed in package by customs agents lawful; fact that
beeper revealed when package opened was minimal intrusion); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581
F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978) (installation lawful by customs agents, monitoring of package
inside house not a search).
86. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
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the case, privacy interests of the public would be better served if a warrant
was required prior to the attachment of the beeper.8 7 A modification of the
particularity requirements for the warrant would have to be implemented
due to the unique characteristics of unforeseeability and lack of control over
the beepers' destinations .1' The majority already indicated a willingness to
modify the warrant application process for beeper installations and left the
door open for a redetermination of the standards for warrant
authorization.89

The requirement for warrant authorization prior to installations of the
beeper would protect the suspected citizen from indiscriminate monitoring
without judicial supervision.90 This would not be difficult because of the
requirement for similar investigation techniques comparable to beeper installations. 91 This modified warrant application has been proposed and should
include: (I) names of the suspects; (2) description of the suspected criminal
activity; (3) reasons for need to monitor; (4) description of object of installation; (5) suspected places where monitoring will occur; and (6) termination
date for the monitoring period.92 The modification requirement is even
543 (1984). The government contends since they have no control over where the beeper will
go, the Court is requiring a warrant prior to every monitoring. See id at -, 104 S. Ct. at
3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 543.
87. See id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 3314, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 555 (Stevens, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
88. See Petitioner's Brief at 42, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 530 (1984) (due to inability to control movement of beeper, would be impossible to
satisfy particularity requirement).
89. See United States v. Karo, - U.S..... 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
543-44 (1984). The Court indicated it might rule on reducing the warrant requirement for
monitoring beepers to reasonable suspicion in a later decision. See id. at - n.5, 104 S. Ct. at
3305 n.5, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 544 n.5. One circuit has already allowed the attachment of a beeper
based on reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1982).
90. See Respondent's Brief at 25, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 530 (1984).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982) (authorizes Attorney General to request order to install
wiretap from federal judge). Among the requirements for application are: (1) full and complete fact statement which describes alleged offense and description of place where communication interception will occur; (2) identity of subjects of investigation; (3) whether other
investigation techniques have been attempted; and (4) time period needed for surveillance. See
id. § 2518(l)(a)-(d). The judge determines probable cause if he finds evidence will be gained by
the surveillance, normal investigative procedures would not be productive, and there is probable cause that facilities sought to be taped will be used by the suspect. See id. § 2518(3)(a)(d).
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3505, 82 L. Ed. 2d
92. Compare United States v. Karo, - U.S .....
530, 543 (1984) (Justice White proposes following warrant requirements: time limit, description of object of installation, and reasons government wants to monitor) with Respondent's
Brief at 23, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984)
(requirements for warrant should include: (1) names of suspects; (2) violations of law; (3)
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more compelling, considering a citizen has no way of knowing when he is
being searched. 93 The government's right to install a beeper in an object
destined for a citizen's possession should not turn on such esoteric grounds
as the lack of a possessory interest
when the installation transforms the citi94
zen into a broadcast station.
The Supreme Court has already established that the government may
monitor a vehicle on public roads, 95 but what happens should that vehicle
enter a private garage?9 6 Without a prior warrant authorizing the monitoring of a private area, the government is caught in the snare of Karo.97 A
warrant requirement for all installations would serve a dual purpose: it
would protect citizens from non-judicially sanctioned monitoring and would
to utilize all the evidence obtained from
allow the government authorities
98
surveillance.
electronic
the
Another unresolved issue exists when a beeper-laden object enters the possession of a third party not named in the warrant. 99 This predicament can
only be reconciled by balancing the interests of law enforcement concerns

summary of anticipated installation and monitoring; (4) termination date for monitoring
period).
93. See Respondent's Brief at 24, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L.
Ed. 530 (1984) (without warrant requirement, citizens' only knowledge of search of premises
would be if government chose to use evidence against them). The government also commits a
search when it monitors a home and discovers the beeper has been moved. See United States
v. Karo, - U.S. -, - n.8, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3313 n.8, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 553 n.8 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980) (government's
consent to installation terminates upon transfer to citizen); United States v. Clayborne, 584
F.2d 346, 349 (10th Cir. 1978) (fact that citizen had no rights in object at time not relevant
after he later took possession); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977) (legal
situation at installation not relevant when citizen took possession without knowledge of
beeper), cert. denied sub nor. Bobisink v. United States, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); see also United
States v. Knotts, - U.S. -, -, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1087, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 65 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (there should not be constitutional difference between planting monitoring device
on citizen or selling him property containing beeper).
95. See United States v. Knotts, - U.S.
103 S. Ct. 1081, 1085, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 62
(1983).
96. See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 272 (5th Cir.) (beeper signal continues
when citizen's car enters private property; therefore, comparison to visual observations would
cease at that point) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981).
104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
97. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
543-44 (1984).
98. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (fourth amendment protection
guaranteed by neutral and detached magistrate determining probable cause); see also United
States v. Karo, - U.S. -, -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 543-44 (1984) (warrant
will prevent abuse and should be required before monitoring private area).
, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3300, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
99. See United States v. Karo, - U.S. -,
537 (1984) (beeper moved from Karo's house to home of Horton).
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and the protection of privacy expectations."o In such situations, monitoring
of the initial transfer to the third party could be justified under an exigent
circumstances approach. 0 1 However, if more extensive monitoring is desired, authorities most take their information before a magistrate for a warrant authorizing continued monitoring. 12 Katz stands for the premise that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"' 0 3 but the Supreme
Court makes its determinations of the constitutionality of the monitoring
based on whether the beeper monitoring took place in automobiles, open
fields, cabins, homes, storage facilities, and lockers." ° A warrant requirement prior to the installation of monitoring devices would ensure a citizen
that his right to remain free from searches would not depend on where he
chooses to take his property.10 5 Furthermore, a warrant requirement would
quell the fears that American society would exist under a surveillance
state. 6
The protection provided by the fourth amendment is ensured by the war-

, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L. Ed. 2d
100. See, e.g., United States v. Place, - U.S. -,
110, 118 (1983) (court must balance importance of governmental interests with intrusion on
individuals); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (public has compelling
interest to prohibit drug trafficking); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir.)
(balancing governmental interest to stop drug manufacturing with minimal intrusion on citizen), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); see also Petitioner's Brief at 35-38, United States v.
Karo, - U.S. -,104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984) (emphasizing reasons government
interests outweigh invasion on individual's privacy).
101. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (warrantless search of car
allowable due to mobility); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1947) (exceptional
circumstances justify warrantless search); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134 (1924)
(vehicles which can move out of jurisdiction can be searched without probable cause).
104 S.Ct. 3296, 3304, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530,
102. See United States v. Karo, - U.S ....
542-43 (1984).
103. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
104. See United States v. Knotts, - U.S. -, -, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 1085, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55,
62 (1983). A person traveling in an automobile has a reduced expectation of privacy. See id.
at -, 103 S.Ct. at 1085-86, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 62. The movement of a monitored object outside
of areas in which an individual maintains an expectation of privacy has been compared to
activity conducted in open fields. See id.at -, 103 S. Ct. at 1086, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 64 (beeper
not monitored within cabin). In Karo, the Court stated that monitoring a beeper inside a home
would require a warrant, while the monitoring of a warehouse was not a search within the
fourth amendment. See United States v. Karo, - U.S..... 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3305-06, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 530, 543-45 (1984).
105. See Respondent's Brief at 23-24, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296,
82 L. Ed. 530 (1984) (warrant requirement for installations would keep government monitoring in check).
106. See United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976) (beeper
could allow authorities to establish "1984" network which could monitor each citizen's movements), vacated sub nom. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 929 (1977). But see United States v. Knotts, - U.S.....-, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 1086, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 55, 63 (Court rejects allegation that government would be capable of continuous sur-
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rant requirement. The installation and monitoring of beepers represents a
threat to the privacy rights of the public. While Karo recognizes the intrusion that monitoring presents, it fails to resolve the problems resulting from
the installation and monitoring of the devices by not requiring a warrant
prior to the installation of a beeper on property destined to come within the
possession of the unsuspecting citizen. Furthermore, by failing to establish
standards for the warrant authorizing the monitoring, the Court has left the
problems of satisfying the particularity requirements to the imagination of
the lower courts. In addition, the decision fails to address the problems confronting law enforcement officials when the beeper passes from the possession of the suspect to the subsequent transferee. These shortcomings leave
the utilization of electronic surveillance devices in a state of confusion,
which will likely force the United States Supreme Court to reexamine the
inherent problems associated with beepers in the future.
Steven J. Berry

veillance without judicial intervention). The concept of society existing under constant surveillance was a prediction of George Orwell's 1984:
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given
moment. How often, or on what system ... was guesswork. It was even conceivable
that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire
whenever they wanted to. You had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness,
every movement scrutinized.
See Respondent's Brief at 25 & n.19, United States v. Karo, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 530 (1984) (quoting G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949)). See generally Comment, Fourth
Amendment Implications of Electronic Tracking Devices, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 243, 251 (1977)
(recognizes possibility of Orwellian society).
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